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ABSTRACT
Anomaly detection is often considered a challenging field of
machine learning due to the difficulty of obtaining anoma-
lous samples for training and the need to obtain a sufficient
amount of training data. In recent years, autoencoders have
been shown to be effective anomaly detectors that train only
on ”normal” data. Generative adversarial networks (GANs)
have been used to generate additional training samples for
classifiers, thus making them more accurate and robust.
However, in anomaly detection GANs are only used to re-
construct existing samples rather than to generate additional
ones. This stems both from the small amount and lack of di-
versity of anomalous data in most domains. In this study we
propose MDGAN, a novel GAN architecture for improving
anomaly detection through the generation of additional sam-
ples. Our approach uses two discriminators: a dense network
for determining whether the generated samples are of suffi-
cient quality (i.e., valid) and an autoencoder that serves as
an anomaly detector. MDGAN enables us to reconcile two
conflicting goals: 1) generate high-quality samples that can
fool the first discriminator, and 2) generate samples that can
eventually be effectively reconstructed by the second dis-
criminator, thus improving its performance. Empirical eval-
uation on a diverse set of datasets demonstrates the merits of
our approach.
INTRODUCTION
In machine learning, anomaly detection aims to identify
abnormal patterns, particularly those that arise from new
classes of behaviors (Chandola, Banerjee, and Kumar 2009).
Although it has been extensively researched, anomaly detec-
tion is often considered a challenging field of machine learn-
ing due to the difficulty of obtaining anomalous samples for
training, a problem that often results in a high false positive
rate.
In recent years, deep neural nets (DNNs) have been used
for training anomaly detection models (Kwon et al. 2017).
Despite their ability to learn complex patterns and po-
tentially generate accurate anomaly detectors, deep learn-
ing models often require large amounts of training data
(Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton 2012). Moreover, sam-
ples of anomalous data must be provided to the algorithm in
Copyright c© 2018,
order to enable it to detect similar samples. Obtaining such
samples can be difficult, and defining all possible types of
anomalies is often close to impossible.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) (Goodfellow et
al. 2014) have been proposed in recent years as a solution to
the two above-mentioned problems. GANs have been used
both to generate additional labeled samples (Odena, Olah,
and Shlens 2016) and to make classifiers more robust to
adversarial attacks (Lee, Han, and Lee 2017). However, to
the best of our knowledge, no GAN-based solution has been
proposed for generating additional samples in the domain of
one-class anomaly detection. The likely cause for the lack of
research in this area is the difficulty for the GAN to generate
“anomalous” samples when only ”normal” ones are avail-
able for training (i.e., it is impossible to generate samples
from all participating classes).
Another obstacle to using GANs in anomaly detection
is the requirement in some domains that the generated
samples be valid. This requirement exists in fields such
as network-based intrusion detection, where the generated
samples need to be realistic in order not to ”throw off”
the detection algorithm. In cases where valid samples are
not a prerequisite (e.g., image classification), existing solu-
tions can be found in the literature (Frid-Adar et al. 2018;
Lemley, Bazrafkan, and Corcoran 2017; Shrivastava et al.
2017).
In this study we aim to improve the performance of
anomaly detection algorithms, specifically autoencoders
(Sakurada and Yairi 2014), by using GANs for generat-
ing new artificial examples of ”normal” cases. In order
to achieve this goal, we present Multi-Discriminator GAN
(MDGAN), a novel GAN architecture that uses two dis-
criminators, each with a different role and cost-function. The
first discriminator attempts to discern the generated samples
from the original ones, thus ensuring that that the generated
samples appear as if they are sampled from the same distri-
bution as the real data (i.e., valid). The second discriminator
is an autoencoder that serves as an anomaly detector by mea-
suring reconstruction error.
MDGAN’s use of two discriminators enables the genera-
tor component to achieve two seemingly conflicting goals:
1) generate high-quality samples that can fool the first dis-
criminator, and 2) generate samples that can be recon-
structed effectively by the second discriminator (the autoen-
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coder). The proposed setting prevents MDGAN from gener-
ating simplistic samples that would be easily reconstructed,
thus forcing the autoencoder to continuously improve its
performance.
To evaluate the merit of our proposed approach we con-
ducted an empirical analysis on ten datasets of varying do-
mains and characteristics (e.g., number of samples, num-
ber of features, etc.). The results of our analysis show that
MDGAN outperforms a widely-used benchmark in the large
majority of tested datasets.
The contributions of this study are twofold: (1) we pro-
pose a novel GAN architecture that enable the generation
of more finely-tuned training samples for one-class anomaly
detection, and; (2) we present an in-depth analysis of the
performance of our proposed approach and its components.
RELATEDWORK
Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection algorithms focus on finding patterns that
do not conform to expected behavior. Anomaly detection
has been applied in various areas, including the fields of
fraud detection (Van Vlasselaer et al. 2015), cyber secu-
rity (Kuypers, Maillart, and Pate-Cornell 2016), medicine
(James and Dasarathy 2014), and even real-time crime de-
tection (Ravanbakhsh et al. 2017).
In this study we focus on spectral anomaly detection
methods (Egilmez and Ortega 2014). Approaches of this
type focus on generating a lower-dimensionality (i.e. com-
pressed) representation of the data, and then using it to re-
construct the original data. The underlying logic is that high
reconstruction error is indicative of an anomaly, since the
characteristics of the original data are not ”as expected.”
This approach includes algorithms such as principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA) (Shyu et al. 2003) and autoencoders
(Sakurada and Yairi 2014). In this study we focus on neu-
ral networks algorithms for anomaly detection (Kwon et al.
2017) and specifically on autoencoders.
Autoencoders
Autoencoders are deep neural networks used for the effi-
cient encoding and reconstruction of input in an unsuper-
vised manner. Traditionally, autoencoders were used for di-
mensionality reduction and feature learning (Hinton and
Salakhutdinov 2006), but currently they are also used for de-
noising (Lu et al. 2013), building generative models (Bengio
et al. 2013), and adversarial training (Mescheder, Nowozin,
and Geiger 2017).
Autoencoders consist of two components: the encoder
and the decoder (see example in Figure 1). The two com-
ponents are trained together: the encoder compresses the
data, and the decoder attempts to reconstruct it. The net-
work uses the reconstruction error to adjust the weights of
the network and obtain compact representations that capture
the ”essence” of the analyzed data.
The ability of autoencoders to reconstruct and de-noise
data makes them useful anomaly detectors (Meidan et al.
2018; Mirsky et al. 2018; Fan et al. 2018), particularly in
Figure 1: An example of an autoencoder with one hidden
layer
cases of one-class anomaly detection (i.e. when only ”nor-
mal” samples are available) (Erfani et al. 2016; Wei et al.
2018). The autoencoder receives a sample (which can also
be made ”noisy” using dropout or a similar technique), com-
presses it using the encoder and then attempts to reconstruct
the original sample using the decoder. The discrepancy be-
tween the original and reconstructed samples is captured by
the loss function and is used to train the neural net. Once
the network is trained, samples with high discrepancy (i.e.,
highly different than expected) are flagged as anomalies.
One of the common means of measuring the discrepancy
between samples is the root mean squared error (RMSE),
which is calculated as
RMSE(X,X ′) =
√
1
n
Σni=1
(
Xi −X ′i
)
(1)
where X and X ′ are the vectors of the original and recon-
structed samples, respectively.
Generative Adversarial Nets
Generative adversarial nets (GANs) (Goodfellow et al.
2014) are deep neural networks architectures consisting of
two sub-networks: a generator and a discriminator. These
sub-networks compete in a Nash equilibrium (zero sum
game), where the goal of the discriminator is to discern sam-
ples produced by the generator from those sampled from
the actual data and the goal of the generator is to fool the
discriminator. Since their introduction in 2014, GANs have
been used in multiple domains, including images, music,
text generation, and anomaly detection.
The application of GANs in anomaly detection has been
proposed for video (Ravanbakhsh et al. 2017) and medical
images (Schlegl et al. 2017). In the former study, the GAN
was trained on the RGB channels of ”normal” videos in an
attempt to reconstruct corrupted videos. The size of the re-
construction error was used to identify anomalous section in
the video. In the latter study, the architecture was trained on
benign retina scans. It is important to note that these stud-
ies do not require the samples generated by the GAN to be
valid, as is the case in some domains (see the Introduction
section).
PROPOSED METHOD
The proposed architecture
Combining GANs and autoencoders requires us to reconcile
two seemingly opposing goals: (1) generating samples that
can be reconstructed by the autoencoder with high accuracy,
and (2) generating samples that are similar to ”real” data.
The reason these two goals are contradictory is that reduc-
ing reconstruction error is easier to achieve with simplistic
samples, while generating samples that are similar to the real
data requires them to be more complex.
Figure 2: MDGAN architecture
In order to address this challenge, we propose the Multi-
Discriminator Generative Adversarial Network (MDGAN).
The proposed architecture, presented in Figure 2, consists of
a single generator G and two discriminators: D1 and D2.
While each discriminator receives, in turn, two batches of
samples – ”real” and generated – their loss functions (i.e.,
goals) are different:
• D1 is a feedforward network whose aim is to correctly
separate the ”real” samples from the generated ones. The
goal of G with respect to D1 is to make the two groups
indistinguishable. We do this by defining the following
two-player minimax game, represented by the following
formula (Goodfellow et al. 2014):
min
G
max
D1
V (D1, G) = Ex˜pdata(x) [logD1(x)]+
Ez˜pz(z) [log(1−D1(G(z)))]
(2)
where D1(x) denotes the probability assigned by D1 to
sample x of being ”real” (i.e. not generated by G).
• D2 is an autoencoder component. Its goal is to correctly
reconstruct all the samples it receives, regardless of them
being real or generated. Unlike other GAN architectures,
the goal of G in this context is to assist D2 (i.e., reduce
D2’s loss function values). The loss function for both D2
and G is the same and is given the mean square error
(MSE) of the sample reconstruction:
L(x, x′) = L(D2) = L(G) = ||x− x′||2 (3)
We train the architecture in the following manner. In every
iteration,G generates a batch of samples. We send the gener-
ated batch to one of the discriminators, along with an equal
size batch of real samples. We calculate the loss for the gen-
erator and the relevant discriminator using either formula 2
or 3, and then use back propagation to update the networks.
The process is then repeated with the second discriminator.
In each iteration, the parameters of the non-participating dis-
criminator are frozen.
Training and initialization strategies
MDGAN utilizes two discriminators with the goal of gen-
erating instances that are both valid and have the ability to
be successfully reconstructed by an autoencoder. However,
we considered the possibility that because of the generator
only being adversarial to D1, the D2 autoencoder may be
”thrown off” by samples generated in the early epochs. This
concern stems from the fact that the generated samples of
early training epochs are not likely to resemble the real data.
By trying to reconstruct these wholly-unrelated samples, the
autoencoder may assimilate false patterns.
To test the hypothesis that the samples generated during
the initial training epochs may be detrimental to D2, we de-
fined a ”warm-up” period for MDGAN. During this period
we train G and D1 as described above, but only train D2
on the real samples. In our experiments we evaluated the
performance of our model on different numbers of warm-up
epochs, ranging from zero to six. Once the warm-up period
is over, we train both discriminators on real and generated
data. The proposed algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 MDGAN training
1: procedure FIT(real data, warm up time)
2: for number of training iterations do
3: real batch← sample batch from real data
4: optimize D1 on real batch
5: sample:
z ∼ N (0, 1)
6: generated data← G(z)
7: optimize D1 on generated data
8: optimize G on D1
9: optimize D2 on real batch
10: if iteration number > warm up time then
11: optimize D2 on generated data
12: optimize G on D2
13: return D2
EVALUATION
Datasets
We evaluated our approach on ten diverse datasets vary-
ing in size, number of attributes, and class imbalance. The
datasets are available on the OpenML1 and Outlier Detection
DataSets (ODDS)2 repositories and their properties are pre-
sented in Table 1. Five datasets are well-known benchmarks
for the anomaly detection task: NSL-KDD (Revathi and
Malathi 2013), Pendigit (Keller, Muller, and Bohm 2012),
1www.openML.org
2http://odds.cs.stonybrook.edu/
Figure 3: D1 architecture (left), G architecture (right)
Annthyroid (Abe, Zadrozny, and Langford 2006), SWaT
(Goh et al. 2016) and breast cancer (Mangasarian 1990).
All datasets represent binary classification problems3,
with the minority class instances defined as the anomalies
we aim to detect.
We partitioned each dataset into training, validation, and
test sets. The partitioning process varied depending on
whether or not pre-defined partitions were in existence:
• For datasets with pre-defined partitions, we removed all
anomalous samples (i.e., the minority class) from the
training set. Of the remaining training set samples, 10%
was randomly selected as the validation set. The test set
was not changed.
• For datasets without pre-defined partitions, we first as-
signed all anomalous samples to the test set. We then as-
signed the remaining samples in the manner described in
Table 1. Again, 10% of the training set was randomly as-
signed to the validation set.
In addition, we normalized all numeric features to the range
[-1,1] and removed all categorical features with more than
three values from the datasets. We took the latter action, be-
cause the categorical features had to be represented using
sparse vectors, and this resulted in reduced performance for
both MDGAN and the baseline.
Training parameters
We used the following settings throughout the evaluation:
• Stopping criteria – all models were trained for 30
epochs. We then chose the architecture configuration that
was in place for the epoch with the highest score on vali-
dation set.
3Some datasets were originally multi-class, but binary versions
exist in online repositories
Dataset # of Fea-
tures
Trainset
size
Testset
size
Anomalies
(%)
NSL-KDD* 39 67,343 22,544 56.92
Pendigit
(Keller,
Muller, and
Bohm 2012)
16 6,000 1,870 17.90
Video injec-
tion (Mirsky
et al. 2018)
115 1,000,000 1,369,902 6.96
Annthyroid
(Abe,
Zadrozny,
and Lang-
ford 2006)
6 6,000 1,200 44.50
Forest cover
(Liu, Ting,
and Zhou
2008)
10 250,000 36,048 7.62
Breast can-
cer (Man-
gasarian
1990)
10 200 599 48.29
CPU 18 3,000 5,192 47.70
Ailerons 40 2,000 11,750 49.60
SWaT*
(Goh et al.
2016)
51 496,000 449,919 11.98
Yeast
(Dheeru and
Karra Taniski-
dou 2017)
8 1,014 470 7.74
Table 1: The characteristics of the evaluated datasets (num-
ber of features, size of the training and test sets, and the
percentage of anomalies). ”*” indicates datasets with pre-
existing partitions
• Learning rate and optimizers – D1 was optimized us-
ing a stochastic gradient descent optimizer with a learning
rate of 0.01. D2 and G were optimized using the Adam
optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001.
• Dropout and batch normalization – G contains a 10%
rate dropout after each hidden layer. D1 contains batch
normalization after each hidden layer.
• Warm up values – we evaluated D2 with warm up val-
ues of zero, one, three, and six epochs (see ”Training and
initialization strategies” in the previous section for more
details).
• Initialization – each experiment was run 30 times, using
different initialization parameters.
Experimental setting
The baseline. Since the goal of MDGAN is to improve
the performance of an autoencoder through the generation
of additional samples, we compared our approach to an
autoencoder with an identical configuration to the one
used by our D2 component. The same validation set-based
stopping criteria was also applied.
Dataset No
Warm
Up
One
Epoch
Warm
Up
Three
Epochs
Warm
Up
Six
Epochs
Warm
Up
NSL-KDD 0.43% 0.9%* 0.51% 0.66%*
Pendigit 4.25%* 2.77% 3.42%* 1.48%
Video injec-
tion
0.03% -2%* -0.4% -0.63%*
Annthyroid -3.96%* -4.01%* -5.9%* -5.03%*
Forest cover 6.73%* 4.12% 1.29% 1.77%
Breast cancer 5.53%* 5.52%* 4.92%* 3.78%*
CPU 0.78%* 0.88%* 0.66%* 0.69%*
Ailerons 2.83%* 1.78%* 2.21%* 1.76%*
SWaT 0.57% 2.27% 2.65% 2.49%
Yeast -2.86% -5.57%* -2.77% -3.44%
Table 2: Percentage of improvement in AUC against the
baseline (higher is better), averaged by 30 different seeds.
”*” indicates significance with 95% confidence
Dataset No
Warm
Up
One
Epoch
Warm
Up
Three
Epochs
Warm
Up
Six
Epochs
Warm
Up
NSL-KDD 0 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%*
Pendigit 14.2%* 12.6%* 12.5%* 3.9%
Video injec-
tion
-0.01%* -0.01%* 0 -0.22%
Annthyroid -2.4% 2.3% 4.1%* 4.2%*
Forest cover 44.8%* 25.2%* 25.6% 12.3%
Breast cancer 3.3%* 3.3%* 3%* 2.3%*
CPU 0.7%* 0.8%* 0.6%* 0.6%*
Ailerons 3.3%* 2.4%* 2.6%* 2.1%*
SWaT -0.04% 7.6% 2.2% 4.7%
Yeast -5.1% 6.6% 4.3% 5.8%
Table 3: Percentage of improvement in AUC PR against the
baseline (higher is better), averaged by 30 different seeds.
”*” indicates significance with 95% confidence
Evaluation measures. We used three evaluation measures
to analyze our results:
• Area under the receiver operating characteristic curve
(AUC) – used to measure the performance of our ap-
proach across all possible true-positive/false-positive val-
ues.
• Area under the precision-recall curve (AUC PRC) –
considered to be more informative than AUC when the
percentage of anomalies is low (i.e., imbalanced datasets).
• Equal error rate (EER) – designed to measure the trade-
off between the false-positive and false-negative rates.
Statistical tests. To validate the significance of our results,
we used the paired t-test on the three evaluation measures
described above. We marked results as significant in cases
where the confidence level of 95% or higher.
The architectures used in our experiments are presented in
Figure 3. Their structure is as follows: G is a four layer neu-
ral net. We used the leaky ReLU function with alpha 0.2
Dataset No
Warm
Up
One
Epoch
Warm
Up
Three
Epochs
Warm
Up
Six
Epochs
Warm
Up
NSL-KDD 0 -2.5% -3.9%* -5.3%*
Pendigit -20.6%* -12.8% 15.7%* 8.6%
Video injec-
tion
1.1% 7.7%* 4.1%* 3.3%*
Annthyroid 6.2%* 5.7% 8.1%* 7.5%*
Forest cover -15.9%* -10.8%* -5.8% -4.3%
Breast cancer -10.8%* -12.4%* -10.2%* -8.5%*
CPU -5.01%* -5.5%* -4.4%* -4.2%*
Ailerons -6.3%* -4.2%* -4.8%* -3.7%*
SWaT 1.5% -0.1% -2.9% -1.7%
Yeast 4.9% 11.4% 6.5% 9%
Table 4: Percentage of improvement in EER against the
baseline (lower is better), averaged by 30 different seeds.
”*” indicates significance with 95% confidence
after each hidden layer and batch normalization. Finally, af-
ter the last fully connected layer we apply the tanh activation
function.
D1 is also a four layer neural net. We used the leaky
ReLU function with alpha 0.2 after each hidden layer, and
then we applied dropout. Finally, after the last fully con-
nected layer we applied the sigmoid activation function to
classify as real or fake.
D2 is a four layer autoencoder, encoding to 70% of the
input dimension, and then to 50%. The decoder is the exact
opposite, decoding to 70% and then to a 100%, same as the
input dimension. We apply ReLU after each hidden layer,
and tanh after the output layer.
Results
Tables 2–4 and Figures 4 and 5 present the performance
of MDGAN according to the three computed performance
measures. In each table we present the ratio of the perfor-
mance measure (averaged over the 30 experiments) of the
MDGAN autoencoder D2 and the baseline autoencoder.
From the results it can be observed that seven of the ten
datasets, the GAN autoencoder outperformed the baseline
autoencoder with the difference being statistically signifi-
cant except for one dataset (SWaT ).
Another interesting (and perhaps counter-intuitive) obser-
vation is that the warm up period does not always improves
the performance of the GAN autoencoder (and even some-
times leads to a degradation in the performance). From our
analysis of the data we conclude that the samples generated
during the warm up period are too similar to the real sam-
ples, thus reducing the generator’s ability to generate ”un-
expected” (and valuable) samples that would make the au-
toencoder more robust. See figure for a comparison of the
warm-up strategies.
Finally, our results lead us to conclude that the size of the
training set does affect the performance of our approach (rel-
ative to the baseline). However, the complexity of the prob-
lem (i.e., the number of features per sample) has a clear ef-
fect on the results: the two datasets for which MDGAN fails
Figure 4: Box-and-whisker plot of the differences in AUC
between the various warm-up configurations and the base-
line, across 30 different seeds
to improve are those with the smallest number of features.
This leads us to conclude that our approach is better suited
for a high-dimensional space, where the generation of addi-
tional samples is a more challenging task.
DISCUSSION
We analyzed the performance of the various components
(i.e., the generator and the two discriminators) and were
able to draw the following conclusions.
Early ”peaking” is indicative of lower performance. For
each of our datasets, we compared the two runs with the best
and worst results for the “no warm-up” configuration. In six
out of the ten datasets, the run which achieved the lower
AUC score terminated considerably earlier (3.5 epochs ear-
lier, on average) when using the validation performance as a
stopping criteria. In the four other datasets, both the best and
the worst were trained for the full 30 epochs (the maximal
number).
We hypothesize that these results reflect the fact that our
MDGAN architecture requires a longer training time to
perform well due to the fact that it has to satisfy a larger
number of constraints compared with a ”standard” GAN
architecture. A short training time may be indicative of the
GAN producing samples do not contribute to the training
process.
The dense discriminator functions as a regulator.
One of the base hypothesis behind MDGAN is that the
dense discriminator network (D1) will assist in guiding
the generator towards generating more ”valid” samples. In
order to test this hypothesis, we compared the loss function
of D1 on the generated samples only for the best and
worst-performing runs in each dataset. Our results show
direct correlation between higher loss function values for
D1 and improved overall performance. An example of this
is presented in Figure 6.
Slower generator-autoencoder convergence is indica-
tive of better results. We once again compare the best and
worst performance for each dataset, but this time we fo-
cus on the generator loss with respect to each discrimina-
tor. Our analysis shows that while in most cases the loss for
D1 (the dense DNN) is similar for the best and worst cases,
the top-performing scenarios often displayed higher initial
generator-loss when training on the autoencoder. Moreover,
the loss reduction was noticeably slower. An example of this
scenario is presented in Figure 7.
We argue that these results show that are model deploys
a variant of adversarial training, in the sense that MDGAN
performs better when the autoencoder has greater difficulty
reconstructing the generated samples. We find it likely that
as a result, the autoencoder becomes better at reconstructing
previously-unseen types of samples.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this study we have presented MDGAN, a novel multi-
discriminator GAN approach for anomaly detection. Our
architecture enables the GAN to reconcile two conflict-
ing aims: 1) generating sophisticated samples that can pass
”real” instances of the dataset, and; 2) create instances that
can be accurately reconstructed by an autoencoder. Using
our approach, we have been able to improve the performance
across a variety of datasets.
For future work, we plan to pursue several directions.
First, we will experiment with more advanced training
strategies, dynamically allocating different weights to each
discriminator. Secondly, we will explore architectures with
a larger number of discriminators in an attempt to reconcile
a more complex of constraints. Thirdly, we will evaluate our
method in the context of generating adversarial samples. Fi-
nally, we plan to apply our approach to additional domains.
Figure 5: % AUC improvement of the different warm ups to the baseline, averaged by 30 different seeds
Figure 6: D1 loss on generated samples during training, best
and worst performance runs; Ailerons (top), Breast Cancer
(bottom). It can be seen that the top-performing architectures
have higher D1 loss values.
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